DePaul Business and Commercial
Law Journal
Volume 2
Issue 2 Winter 2004

Article 2

Judicial Treatment of Charitable Donations in Bankruptcy Before
and After the Religious Liberty and Charitable Contribution
Protection Act of 1998
John J. Dyer
Gregory Todd Jones

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/bclj

Recommended Citation
John J. Dyer & Gregory T. Jones, Judicial Treatment of Charitable Donations in Bankruptcy Before and
After the Religious Liberty and Charitable Contribution Protection Act of 1998, 2 DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J.
265 (2004)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/bclj/vol2/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Digital Commons@DePaul. It has
been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons@DePaul. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

Judicial Treatment of Charitable Donations in Bankruptcy
Before and After the Religious Liberty and Charitable
Contribution Protection Act of 1998
John J. Dyer*
Gregory Todd Jones**

I.

INTRODUCTION

In seventeenth and eighteenth century England, courts protected
creditors' rights by hanging uncooperative debtors.1 In contrast, present day United States courts will not hang bankrupt debtors, but will
protect them as well as their creditors' commercial interests. 2 This
Article will focus on the judicial ramifications of one statutory protection that the federal government has given to debtors, the Religious
Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998 (the "Donation Act"), 3 and consider the influence that this protection has exerted
on creditors' rights - an issue that is of significant import for practitioners in the areas of commercial law and bankruptcy.
Congress designed the Bankruptcy Code around two goals: allowing
a debtor to obtain a fresh start, while at the same time treating creditors as fairly as possible. 4 In 1978, when Congress reformed Chapter
13 of the Bankruptcy Code, it demonstrated concern for creditors' in* Law Clerk to the Honorable Joyce Bihary, United States Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Georgia. B.A., 1998, Longwood University; J.D., 2002, Georgia State University College
of Law. Both authors would like to express their sincere appreciation to Dean Marjorie Girth, a
nationally renowned expert in bankruptcy matters and a rare mentor whose gentle guidance has
afforded them many opportunities and suggested direction for both of their careers.
** Senior Research Fellow, Consortium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, and Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. B.A., 1983, University of the
South, Sewanee, Tennessee; M.B.A., 1994, Auburn University; J.D., 2003, Georgia State University College of Law; M.P.A., 2003, Georgia State University Andrew Young School of Policy
Studies; Ph.D., Decision Sciences, 2003, Georgia State University Robinson College of Business.
1. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 4 (1992).
2. Richard Collin Mangrum, Tithing, Bankruptcy and the Conflict between Religious Freedom
and Creditors Interests, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 815, 818-19 (1999).
3. Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 105-183,
112 Stat. 517 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2004)).
4. Mangrum, supra note 2, at 819; see also Thomas M. Walsh, Note, Religious Liberty and
Charitable Donation Act of 1998: Putting the Fear of God into Bankruptcy Creditors, 7 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 235, 238-39 (1999) (stating that bankruptcy in the United States has a
strong public policy of giving debtors a fresh start... [while] ensur[ing] the orderly distribution
of a debtors assets to its creditors).
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terests by requiring that debtors' plans be in the best interest of the
unsecured creditors. 5 Hence, bankruptcy courts frequently invali-

dated any Chapter 13 debtor's plan that included anything more than
a nominal regular donation to a charity. 6 Bankruptcy courts applied

similar standards under Chapter 7 by refusing relief from debts result7
ing from a debtor's charitable donations.

Although courts generally struck down debtors' charitable donations, in 1996, the Eighth Circuit ruled in favor of philanthropic debtors in Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church.8 This case was
seen as a major victory for charities, especially religious groups. 9
There, the court held that a debtor's charitable gifts to his church
could not be recovered by a bankruptcy trustee because of the Relig-

ious Freedom Restoration Act.10 However, the victory was short
lived.

The Supreme Court announced its decision in City of Boerne v. Flores1 one year after the first Christiansdecision was reported. In Flores, the Court held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was
unconstitutional as applied to state law. 12 Interestingly, the Flores
case did not deal with a church's receipt of money; rather, it was the
result of a dispute between the Archbishop of San Antonio and the

city government over the validity of a city ordinance that required the
5. C. Scott Pryor, Tension Between the Trustee and the Tithe: Is P.L. 105-183 Absolution?, 17
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 36 (1999).

6. See generally id.; In re Andrade, 213 B.R. 765, 769 (Bankr. E.D. Ca. 1997) (recognizing that
although a few courts have held that charitable donations were acceptable, that line of cases is
the minority view and has been criticized) (citations omitted).
7. Oliver B. Pollack, Be Just Before You're Generous: Tithing and CharitableContributions in
Bankruptcy, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 527, 554 (1996) (citing In re Sutliff, 79 B.R. 151,158 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that the Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 standards for bankruptcy abuse by
debtors were similar)). Pollack also notes, however, that a debtor who wishes to continue to
make charitable contributions is better off filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 than under
Chapter 13 because under Chapter 7 the debtors assets will be dispersed and the debt will be
discharged quickly. Id. Therefore, the court will have less interest in the debtor's future income
and budget. Id.
8. 82 F.3d 1407, 1417 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
protects charitable donations from avoidance even if they are fraudulent), vacated and remanded, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998). It should be noted that although the Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the Eighth Circuit's decision in Christians to be retried in light of the City
of Boerne v. Flores opinion, the Eight Circuit did not reverse its previous ruling. Pryor, supra
note 5, at 35. The Eighth Circuit's decision upon remand supports the view that the Flores
decision only affected state laws, and not bankruptcy law, which would indicate that Christians
was still valid law despite the belief of many bankruptcy trustees otherwise. Walsh, supra note 4,
at 249-50.
9. Walsh, supra note 4, at 249.
10. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 1998).
11. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
12. Id. at 511.
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church to obtain a building permit to enlarge the church in a historical
district. 13 The Court held that the church could not rely upon the Religious Freedom Restoration Act because it would be an unconstitutional burden on the states to invalidate a law which a state had
passed with a showing of "a compelling [state] interest and... [which
the state] adopted [using] the least restrictive means of achieving that
interest"'14 just because the law had a negligible effect upon a religious
interest.15 It should be noted that the Court did not determine
whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was unconstitutional
16
as applied to federal law, i.e., the Bankruptcy Code.
Concerned religious and charitable groups persuaded members of
Congress that the Flores decision had a negative effect upon a
debtor's right to donate money to charitable organizations.17 Congress quickly responded by passing the Donation Act. 18 The Donation Act amended several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
(including 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548, 707, and 1325) in an effort to head
off the perceived negative effect that the Flores decision would have
on a bankrupt debtor's ability to make charitable donations. 19
This Article will examine the effects that the Donation Act has actually had upon a debtor's ability to make charitable donations while
petitioning for relief under various provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code. First, it will offer a basic explanation of the general mechanics
of each of the relevant bankruptcy provisions that will be discussed
throughout the Article and of how a charitable contribution is normally analyzed under those provisions. Next, it will discuss how
courts handled bankrupt debtors' charitable contributions before
Congress passed the Donation Act. Third, it will analyze the different
ways in which courts have interpreted the Donation Act since its enactment. Fourth, it will compare and contrast the ways in which
courts have handled charitable donations by bankrupt debtors under
the new law. The Article will conclude with a discussion about the
actual effects, or lack thereof, that the Donation Act has had upon
courts' treatment of debtors' charitable donations.
13. Id. at 512; see also Walsh, supra note 4, at 249.
14. Flores, 521 U.S. at 534. It should be noted that the Supreme Court did not expressly
overturn the holding in Christians. See generally id.
15. Id.
16. See generally Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (determining the constitutionality with regard to
a local law).
17. See 144 CONG. REc. H3999, H4000 (comments of Rep. Nadler) (stating that the Supreme
Court's decision in Flores has left the Religious Freedom Restoration Act's ability to protect
charitable donations by bankrupt debtors in doubt).
18. Walsh, supra note 4, at 250.
19. See 144 Cong. Rec. H3999-02, H4000, H4005 (1998).
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BASIC MECHANICS OF RELEVANT BANKRUPTCY
CODE PROVISIONS

To lay a foundation, Subsection A will describe the basic ideas behind Chapter 13 bankruptcy and the general functions of Bankruptcy
Code provisions that normally control Chapter 13 cases affected by
the Donation Act. Subsection B will discuss the basic concepts within
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the mechanics of the Bankruptcy Code provisions that normally govern Chapter 7 cases, and those provisions that
were changed by the Donation Act. In addition, Subsection B will
examine a Bankruptcy Code provision that was not changed by the
Donation Act, but which often comes up in Chapter 7 bankruptcy
cases and, as such, is relevant to the examination of courts treatment
of charitable donations. Subsection C considers the effect of the Donation Act on provisions of the Bankruptcy Code commonly utilized
in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases.
A.

Chapter 13 Bankruptcy

Chapter 13 allows debtors to retain their assets when filing for
bankruptcy, while simultaneously gaining the benefit of having their
debts discharged. 20 Upon filing for relief under Chapter 13, debtors
must submit several reports, called schedules, which describe their expected monthly income and their necessary monthly expenses.2 1 The
bankruptcy trustee 22 will then subtract the debtor's necessary monthly
expenses from the debtor's monthly income, the difference of which is
23
recognized as the debtor's disposable income.
A debtor must then agree to divert all of his disposable income into
a bankruptcy fund or estate which is managed by the bankruptcy trustee, who will disperse the funds appropriately, according to a hierarchy of creditors. 24 Chapter 13 debtors must continue to pay creditors
all of their disposable income for a designated amount of time, usually
three to five years.25
20. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON
BANKRUPTCY 907-08 (1985) (citing Ravenot v. Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir.
1982)).
21. Id. at 907-12.
22. The bankruptcy trustee is the person who is charged by the bankruptcy courts with the
responsibility of reviewing and overseeing the maintenance of the bankruptcy plan. See id. at 4445.
23. Id. at 907-12.
24. Id.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2003) (stating that courts may approve plans of up to three years and
can approve plans of up to five years if the circumstances make such a plan necessary); see John
B. Butler III, A Chapter 13 Trustee Looks at Section 1325(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 63 AM.
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1. A Look At 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) 26
Section 1325(b) provides the requisite elements needed in order to
qualify for disposable income. 27 Prior to the Donation Act's enactment, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) defined disposable income as:
[I]ncome which is received by the debtor and which is not reasonably necessary to be expended (A) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependant of
the debtor ... and
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation, and opera28
tion of such business.
This definition of disposable income gave the courts a considerable
amount of discretion in determining what qualified as a reasonably
necessary expense. 29 In an attempt to clarify whether a charitable donation was a reasonably necessary expense, the Donation Act
amended § 1325(b)(2)(A) and:
[A]dd[ed] the words "including charitable contributions (that meet
the definition of 'charitable contribution' under 548(d)(3)) to a
qualified religious or charitable entity or organization (as that term
is defined in § 548(d)(4)) in an amount not to exceed 15 percent
[sic] of the gross income'30of the debtor for the year in which the
contributions are made."
Although this amendment seems to have clarified the issue of whether
charitable contributions can satisfy the demands of the § 1325(b) disposable income test, there are issues left unsettled that still give courts
31
discretion over the matter.
It should also be noted that although the disposable income test is a
provision that is directly applicable in Chapter 13 cases, courts have
applied its principles as a means of reaching a decision under other
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 32
BANKR.L.J. 401, 413 (1989) (citing In re Krull, 54 B.R. 375, 377 (Bankr. D. Colo.1985)) (commenting that at least one court has held that all disposable income to be paid to creditors for up
to three years); Mindy L. Silver, Recent Development, The Disposable Income Test. An Attempt
Toward Uniformity, 4 BANKR. DEV. J. 221 (1987).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2002).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2002).
28. Silver, supra note 25, at 221 n.1 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (West Supp. 1985)).
29. Butler, supra note 25, at 408-09.
30. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1325-57 (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 15th ed. 2003).

31. See In re Buxton, 228 B.R. 606 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1999) (holding that although Congress
amended the 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) disposable income test to allow some charitable contributions,
the Code still imposes a reasonableness requirement on the donations).
32. See In re Shimula, 234 B.R. 240 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1999) (applying the § 1325 disposable income test to a § 707(b) substantial abuse analysis); In re Laman, 221 B.R. 379 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1998) (applying the § 1325(b) disposable income test to a Chapter 7 § 707(b) substantial abuse
analysis); Feldmann v. Feldmann (In re Feldmann), 220 B.R. 138 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1998) (apply-

270

DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

B.

[Vol. 2:265

Bankruptcy Under Chapter 7

When a debtor files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy she will not be allowed to keep all of her assets. Instead her non-exempt assets 33 will
be sold or liquidated by a bankruptcy trustee who will then distribute
34
the proceeds to creditors according to bankruptcy regulations.
1. The Substantial Abuse Provision: 11 U.S.C. § 707
Section 707(b) states that when a petitioner seeking relief under
Chapter 7 has primarily consumer debt, a court may act sua sponte or
in response to a trustee's motion, and decide to dismiss a debtor's petition for bankruptcy relief if it finds that discharging the debt "would
be a substantial abuse. ' 35 Bankruptcy courts use this power to disallow a debtor relief when the court determines that the debtor can afford to pay her debts out of future earnings. 36 However, § 707(b)
does not include a clear indication that the ability to pay should be the
determining factor in deciding whether granting a debtor relief would
result in substantial abuse. Hence, not all courts will deny a claim for
bankruptcy relief based solely on a debtor's ability to pay out future
earnings. 37 Prior to the enactment of the Donation Act, the language
of § 707(b) read as follows:
(b) After notice and a hearing the court, on its own motion or on a
motion by the United States trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily
consumer debts if it finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter. There shall be a
presumption
in favor of granting the relief requested by the
38
debtor.
ing the § 1325(b) disposable income test to a § 523(a)(15) ability to pay analysis); In re Smither,
194 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996) (holding that the § 1325(b) disposable income test case law
had been adopted by courts applying § 523(15)); Lynn v. Diversified Collection Serv. (In re
Lynn), 168 B.R. 693 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (holding that the § 1325(b) definition of disposable
income was applicable in making a § 523(a)(8) determination)).
33. When determining whether a piece of property is exempt or part of the bankruptcy estate,
the trustee must first look to 11 U.S.C. § 541 to see if the asset fits into the federal bankruptcy
laws' definition of property of the estate. BAIRD, supra note 1, at 38-45. If the asset is not
correctly classified as property of the estate then the trustee cannot capture it. Id. If the asset is
correctly classified as property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541 then 11 U.S.C. § 522 mandates that the trustee must look to state and federal non-bankruptcy laws to see if there are any
statutes which define the asset as exempt. Id. If there are any such statutes then the asset is
exempt, if not the asset is non-exempt and can be liquidated by the trustee. Id.
34. BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 20, at 44-45.
35. BAIRD, supra note 1, at 34.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (West Group 1994).

2004]

CHARITABLE DONATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY

The Donation Act amended § 707(b) to include the words "[i]n
making a determination whether to dismiss a case under this section,
the court may not take into consideration whether a debtor has made,
or continues to make, charitable contributions. '39 Following this
amendment, courts were no longer allowed to consider a debtor's
charitable contributions in determining whether the debtor had an
ability to pay creditors out of future earnings when conducting a
40
§ 707(b) substantial abuse analysis.
Under § 707(a) a court may dismiss a case "for cause" following
notice to the debtor and a hearing. 41 When making a determination
of whether to dismiss a case for cause under § 707(a), courts have applied a totality of the circumstances test which allows a court to look
at all of the circumstances surrounding the debtor's bankruptcy and
decide whether granting the debtor relief would be equitable. 42 It is
important to note that, unlike § 707(b), the Donation Act did not prohibit courts from considering a debtor's charitable donations when deciding cases under § 707(a). 43 It is also important to note that there is
no restriction preventing a party from filing a motion to dismiss under
§ 707(a) - unlike the § 707(b) motions to dismiss, which can only be
raised by the court itself or by the bankruptcy trustee. 44 Thus, under
§ 707(a), a creditor may file a motion to dismiss for cause which will
prompt the courts to apply roughly the same test as they would apply
in a § 707(b) analysis, however, in the § 707(a) situation the courts will
be able to consider the debtor's charitable contributions. 45 The result
of a dismissal under § 707(a) is the same as a dismissal under § 707(b);
the debtor is denied discharge of their debts.
39. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2003).
40. See generally RESNICK, supra note 30, at 1325-57.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2003). 707(a) states:
(a) The court may dismiss a case under this chapter after notice and a hearing and only
for cause, including (1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(2) nonpayment of any fees [or] and charges required under chapter 123 of title 28;
and
(3) failure of a debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen days or such additional time as the court may allow after filing of the petition commencing such
case, the information required by paragraph (1) of section 521, but only on a
motion by the United States trustee.
Id.
42. In re Collins, 250 B.R. 645, 654 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000).
43. Id.
2000).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a), (b) (2003); In re Collins, 250 B.R. 645, 654 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
45. Collins, 250 B.R. at 654.
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Generally Applicable Provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

The provisions discussed below are commonly utilized in both
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases.

1. 11 U.S.C. § 54846
Section 548 is the provision of the Bankruptcy Code which deals
with fraudulent transfers of funds.47 This provision allows a Chapter
13 bankruptcy trustee to reach back and avoid transfers of funds made
by debtors within one year prior to the debtor filing for bankruptcy. 48
Prior to the enactment of the Donation Act, the relevant provisions of
§ 548 read as follows:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor
in property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made
or incurred on or within one year before the date of the filing of the
petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or
became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for such transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such
transfer or obligation . . .49
The pre-amendment version of § 548, as quoted above, allowed courts
to avoid both transfers that were actually fraudulent 50 and those that
were constructively fraudulent, including donations made to charitable organizations. 51 Section 548 handles actual and constructively
fraudulent transfers separately. 52 Section 548(a)(1)(A) demands evidence of actual intent to defraud creditors, while § 548(a)(1)(B) allows a trustee to avoid a transfer despite a lack of any evidence of
actual intent to defraud creditors.5 3
46. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2003).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2003).
48. See id. § 548(a)(1).
49. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 535 n.2 (1994) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 548
(1988)).
50. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1).
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2); see also Steven Walt, Generosity in Bankruptcy: The New Place
of CharitableContributionsin FraudulentConveyance Law, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1030-31 (1999)
(stating that the unamended version of 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) permitted a court to hold a donation as constructive fraud where a debtor did "not receive reasonably equivalent value" for the
transfer).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2003).
53. Mangrum, supra note 2, at 815 n.2.

2004]

CHARITABLE DONATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY

273

The Donation Act amended § 548 to prevent bankruptcy trustees
from using it to avoid charitable donations made by insolvent debtors
during the year before they filed for bankruptcy. 54 The amended 11
U.S.C. § 548 states:
(a)(2) A transfer of a charitable contribution to a qualified religious
or charitable entity or organization shall not be considered to be a
transfer covered under paragraph (1)(B) in any case in which
(A) the amount of that contribution does not exceed 15 percent of
the gross annual income of the debtor for the year in which the
transfer of the contribution is made; or
(B) the contribution made by a debtor exceeded the percentage
amount of gross annual income specified in subparagraph (A), if the
transfer was consistent with the practices of the debtor in making
charitable contributions ....
(d)(3) In this section, the term "charitable contribution" means a
charitable contribution, as that term is defined in section 170(c) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, if that contribution
(A) is made by a natural person; and
(B) consists of
(i) a financial instrument (as that term is defined in section
731(c)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986); or
(ii) cash
(4) In this section, the term "qualified religious or charitable entity
or organization" means
(A) an entity described in section 170(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986; or
in section 170(c)(2) of the
(B) an entity or organization described
55
Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
Although this amendment may protect constructively fraudulent
transfers, it does not offer any protection for those transfers that are
56
acts of actual fraud.
2.

11 U.S.C. § 544(b)

Section 544(b) grants bankruptcy trustees the power to avoid transfers made by debtors in violation of state laws.57 The ability of trustees to avoid transfers under applicable state law is a significant power
as it can allow a trustee to use the applicable state's reach back period,
54. See CONG. REC. H3999-02, H4000 (1998) (statement of Mr. Nadler) (stating that "[tihis
legislation would protect religious and charitable donations in bankruptcy proceedings by clarifying that they are not fraudulent transfers"); see also Walt, supra note 52, at 1030-31.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2003).
56. Walsh, supra note 4, at 259.
57. Pryor, supra note 5, at 36.
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which is usually longer than the one year limit provided by § 548.58
Prior to the enactment of the Donation Act, § 544 read as follows:
(b)The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable
under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that
is allowable under section 502 of this 59title or that is not allowable
only under section 502(e) of this title.
The Donation Act amended § 544 to disallow a trustee the ability to
use state laws to avoid transfers made before the debtor filed for
bankruptcy. 60 The Donation Act's amendment of § 544 states in relevant part:
(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the trustee may avoid
any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by
a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or that is not allowable only under section
502(e) of this title.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a transfer of a charitable contribution (as that term is defined in section 548(d)(3)) that is not covered under section 548(a)(1)(B), by reason of section 548(a)(2).
Any claim by any person to recover a transferred contribution in
the preceding sentence under Federal or State law in a Federal or
61
State court shall be preempted by the commencement of this case.
However, it has been argued that the amendment to § 544 is defective because it only disallows state law avoidance of transfers which
are not covered by § 548(a)(1)(B), the constructive fraud provision of
the statute, by virtue of the language of § 548(a)(2), the provision
which creates an exception for charitable donations. 62 The contention
is that this statutory language is faulty because it allows a trustee the
opportunity to make a reasonable argument that because § 544 limits
its protection to only those transfers which would have been covered
by § 548(a)(1)(B), i.e. those made within one year before the debtor
filed for bankruptcy, the amended version of § 544 does not offer protection for transfers made earlier than one year before the debtor filed
for bankruptcy from attack under state laws. 63 Thus, as Professor
Walt indicates, if a state law has a five year reach back provision an
unsecured creditor may be able to use that law to attack a transfer
58. Walsh, supra note 4, at 239 n.21 (noting that "New York[, for example,] has a six year
reach back period").
59. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (West Group 1999).
60. See generally RESNICK, supra note 30, at 1325-57.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2003); see also Pryor, supra note 5, at 36 (noting that the Donation Act
amended 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)).
62. Walt, supra note 52, at 1035.
63. Id. at 1035-37.
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made by a debtor anytime between one and five years prior to filing
for bankruptcy. 64
3.

11 U.S.C. § 52365

Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that certain types of
debt are non-dischargeable even if the debtor is granted relief via one
of the Bankruptcy Code chapters. 66 Section 523 contains a lengthy list
of debts that cannot be discharged, including debts for fraud, willful
and malicious injury caused by the debtor, certain taxes, child support,
divorce support, and student loans. 67 This section will focus on
§§ 523(a)(8) and (15) which deal with student loans and divorce support payments, respectively. 68 Section 523(a)(8) provides that student
loans are generally not dischargeable, however the court can make
69
exceptions if payment of the debt would be an "undue hardship.
The language providing this exception states that:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or
1328(b) of this title [these are the provisions granting discharge
from debt under Chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13 respectively] does not
discharge an individual debtor from any debtB
(8) for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made ... by a
governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to
repay funds received as an educational benefit, .. . unless excepting
an unsuch debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose
70
due hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents.
This statutory language has been interpreted by courts to demand
that a debtor satisfy three elements in order to successfully claim that
71
repayment of their student loans would result in an undue hardship.
The elements are as follows: first, the debtor must be unable to repay
the loan and maintain a base standard of living; second, there must be
proof that the debtor's financial condition will remain the same for a
large portion of the repayment period; and third, there must be proof
that the debtor has made a good faith attempt to repay the loan
72
before filing for bankruptcy.
64. Id.
65. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2003).
66. See id.
67. Id. at § 523 (a)(1),(2),(4) - (6),(8),(15).
68. 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8), (15) (2003).
69. Id. at § 523 (a)(8).
70. Id.
71. See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. McLeroy (In re McLeroy), 250 B.R. 872, 878 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 2000); See also Wegrzyniak v. United States (In re Wegrzyniak), 241 B.R. 689, 691-92
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1999).
72. See Mcleroy, 250 B.R. at 878; see also Wegrzyniak, 241 B.R. at 691-92.
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Although § 523 was not amended by the Donation Act, 73 it is relevant to this discussion because bankrupt debtors have attempted to
use the Donation Act in order to seek protection for their charitable
donations, while at the same time claiming that their student loans
should not be excepted from discharge under the undue hardship provision of § 523(a)(8). 74 In addition, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(A) provides an exception from the general rule that debt incurred as part of
divorce or separation is non-dischargeable. 75 However, to qualify for
the exception the debtor must show that he cannot pay the debt because after paying all of his reasonably necessary expenses, he does
not have enough income left over to pay the debt. 76 Section
523(a)(15)(A) states that a debt resulting from a divorce is not dischargeable, unless the debtor does not have the ability to pay such
debt from income or property of the debtor not reasonably necessary
to be expended for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor. 77 Again, although the Donation Act did not
amend § 523(a)(15)(A), debtors have tried to use the Donation Act to
protect their charitable donations by asking the court to include their
donations as an expense that is reasonably necessary for their
78
support.
III.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE DONATIONS
IN BANKRUPTCY

A.

Before the Donation Act

This section will examine the facts and holdings of bankruptcy cases
where the debtor had made or planned to make charitable donations
prior to the Donation Act.
1. Charitable Contribution Cases under § 1325(b)
In Zaleski,79 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of North Dakota
held that a debtor's Chapter 13 plan could not be confirmed because it
violated § 1325(b)(2). 8o In Zaleski the debtors presented a plan which
contained several expenses, including a monthly charitable donation
of $65.00, that the court found to be excessive and in violation of the
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

11 U.S.C. § 523 (2003).
See McLeroy, 250 B.R. 872; see also Wergzyniak, 241 B.R. at 693.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(A) (2003).
See id.
Id.
See Dennison v. Hammond (In re Hammond), 236 B.R. 751, 760 (Bankr. D. Utah 1998).
In re Zaleski, 216 B.R. 425 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1997).
Id. at 432-33.
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spirit of § 1325(b)(2). 8 1 The court specifically stated that the charitable donation could not reasonably be classified as necessary for the
family's maintenance.8 2 The court lumped the charitable donations in
with expenses such as unspecified recreation and an unidentified dental plan, thus indicating that charitable contributions were to be given
83
no special treatment.
Likewise, in Saunders,s4 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Massachusetts held that a debtor's plan could not be confirmed be85
cause the plan included a $400.00 monthly donation to their church.
The court held that it would be inappropriate to allow a person to
donate money to a church when the same donation to a non-religious
group would be a violation of § 1325(b). 6 The court reasoned in
reaching its conclusion that bankrupt debtors do not have a right to
tithe - stating that "[a]bsent the most unusual circumstances, one's religion ought not to affect one's legal rights or duties or benefits."8 7
Conversely, in 1989 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut held that a bankrupt debtor's charitable contribution to his
church was a "reasonably necessary expenditure" within the meaning
of § 1325(b)(1)(B). 88 In the Bien 89 case, the debtor filed for relief
under Chapter 13.90 The bankruptcy trustee objected under
§ 1325(b)(1)(B) because the trustee believed that the debtor's plan
did not distribute all of the debtor's disposable income to the creditors. 91 The debtor's plan claimed a monthly income of $2,732.08 and
monthly expenses of $2,621.48.92 The debtor planned to pay his creditors $85.00 per month out of the $110.60 difference between his income and expenses. 93 The trustee's primary objection was that
$391.65 of the debtor's monthly expenses went to the Mormon church
as a tithe. 94 The parties stipulated that, although tithing was not re81. Id. at 432 (noting that $200.00 per month for wear and tear on a leased car and $416.00 per
month for a new truck were also excessive and that the truck expense was "an absurd luxury
bordering on the lifestyles of the rich and famous").
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. In re Saunders, 215 B.R. 800 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997).
85. Id. at 802-03.
86. Id. at 803.
87. Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and in judgment).
88. In re Bien, 95 B.R. 281, 282 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989).
89. Bien, 95 B.R. at 281.
90. Id. at 281.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 281.
94. See Bien, 95 B.R. at 281.
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quired of all members of the Mormon church, only tithing members
may participate fully in the church's activities. 95 The court held that
religion is fundamental for many people and that the Mormon Church
was a fundamental part of the debtor's life in this case. 96 Hence, because the church required the debtor to tithe before it would allow
him to participate fully in the church, the charitable donation was not
disposable income under § 1325(b)(2)(A). 97 Thus, for this court the
determinative factor was that the debtor actually received something
98
tangible for his money.
2.

Charitable Contribution Cases under § 707

In Laman,99 the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Texas held that it would be a substantial abuse of the bankruptcy system to allow a debtor to discharge his debt under Chapter 7 because
the court found that the debtor did have the ability to pay his creditors
without resorting to Chapter 7 liquidation.10° The court reasoned that
when determining whether a debtor had an ability to pay his debt, the
correct test would be to determine if the debtor could afford to pay
Aa significant dollar amount, irrespective of percentage, to unsecured
creditors through such a Chapter 13 . . . plan. 10 1 The fact that the
court found a number of expenses, including a monthly charitable donation of at least $200.00 that is not allowed under § 1325(b)(2)(A),
supported its conclusion that the debtors, had they applied for Chapter 13 relief, could have supported themselves and paid their creditors
102
sufficiently.
Likewise in Lee,'0 3 the court dismissed the debtors' Chapter 7 petition under § 707(b) where the debtor planned to begin donating
$350.00 per month to his church after he filed for bankruptcy. 10 4 The
court held that the debtor's charitable donations should be included as
part of his disposable income, and that therefore the debtor had the
95. Bien, 95 B.R. at 281-82 (noting that any non-full tithing members of the Mormon church
may not attend services nor pray in the central church in Salt Lake City nor can those members
hold a Temple Recommend nor be called to serve in offices of responsibility within the church).
96. Id. at 283.
97. See id. at 283.
98. See id.
99. In re Laman, 221 B.R. 379 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998).
100. Id. at 383.
101. Id. at 383-84.
102. See id. at 382-83 (noting that in addition the charitable donation the debtors had other
excessive expenses such as $120.00 per month for dry cleaning, $267.00 per month in telephone
bills and $500.00 per month for clothes).
103. In re Lee, 162 B.R. 31 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).
104. Id. at 32; see also Pollak, supra note 9, at 557.
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ability to repay his creditors. 10 5 The court then found that under the
circumstances it would have been a substantial abuse of the bankruptcy system to allow the debtor's claim to proceed and dismissed the
10 6
claim under § 707(b).
3.

Charitable Contribution Cases under § 548

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas avoided charitable
contributions under § 548 in the Newman case. 10 7 There, the debtors
were an elderly husband and wife who had made monthly donations
to their church in the year prior to filing for bankruptcy. 0 8 The court
held that the debtors did not receive reasonably equivalent value for
$2,442.22 of the $2,457.72 total amount transferred to the church during the year before they filed.' 0 9 The strength of the debtors' religious
beliefs was found irrelevant in determining whether the debtors had
received equivalent value for their donations.1 0 Instead, the court decided to focus on any economic or tangible benefits that the debtors
may have received in exchange for their money; the court subsequently found that the debtors had received no such benefits."' In
articulating its reasons for avoiding the donations, the court noted that
400 years ago those who created the bankruptcy laws from which our
Bankruptcy Code was developed decided, for policy reasons, that certain transactions should be recoverable by creditors without any evi112
dence of fraud.
Conversely, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Georgia returned the exact opposite verdict on nearly identical facts
in the Moses case. 113 There the court refused to avoid the debtors'
transfers, which totaled $4,733.50, because it felt that the debtors had
received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for their donations.11 4 In its reasoning, the court actually stated that the debtors did
not receive anything tangible in exchange for their contributions, but
held that they did receive some return on their money in the form of
counseling and the benefit of the heat and air conditioning provided
105. In re Lee, 162 B.R. 31, 32 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993); see also Pollak, supra note 9, at 557.
106. See In re Lee, 162 B.R. 31, 43 (Bankr. N.D. 1993).
107. Newman v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239, 242-43 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1995).
108. Id. at 243-44.
109. Id. at 243, 246.
110. Id. at 246.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 245.
113. See Moses v. Chapel Hill Harvester Church, Inc. (In re Moses), 59 B.R. 815 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1986).
114. Id. at 816, 818-19.

280

DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 2:265

by the church during its services.1 ' 5 Also, the court took note of the

fact that there was no indication of fraudulent intent on the part of the

117
debtors, 116 a factor that the Newman court would declare irrelevant.

4.

Charitable Contribution Cases under § 523

In Lynn, 1 8 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona held
that a debtor's charitable donations were an inappropriate expense
under § 523(a)(8). 119 There, the court considered whether her charitable donations were a "necessary expense for [her] maintenance and
support . . . [which should] be omitted from [her] 'disposable income."120 The court then held that because the debtor did not re-

ceive services from her church in exchange for her donations, the
12
donations could not be characterized as a necessary living expense. '
The court concluded that the debtor's student loans were non22

dischargeable.1
In Feldmann,123 the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Georgia held that a debtor was not eligible for a discharge of his divorce related debt under § 523(a)(15). 124 In reaching this conclusion,
the court had to determine whether the debtor had sufficient disposable income to pay the debt. 125 The court applied the disposable income test of § 1325(b) in its analysis. 126 Using § 1325(b) guidelines,
the court looked to the debtor's claimed expenses, including his
monthly donation to the University of Washington Boosters. 127 In its
discussion of why the charitable contribution was not allowed, the
court noted that the debtor had "no right to more discretionary in115. Id. at 818-19.
116. Id. at 819-20.
117. See Newman v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239, 245 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1995).
118. Lynn v. Diversified Collection Serv. (In re Lynn), 168 B.R. 693 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994).
119. Id. at 700. The debtor held "strong religious beliefs" that compelled her to donate ten
percent of her income to the church. Id. at 696.
120. Id. at 697. The court expressly used the definition of disposable income found in
§ 1325(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 697 n.6.
121. Id. at 700. The court also noted that the debtors' church had express provisions that
allowed members to cease donating in circumstances where the member is impoverished and
that the debtor would not lose any privileges for failing to donate. See id.
122. Id. at 700.
123. Feldmann v. Feldmann (In re Feldmann), 220 B.R. 138 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1998).
124. Id. at 144-45.
125. Id. at 145,
126. Id. at 144.
127. Id. at 145. The court also scrutinized the debtors' claims of $25.00 per month for football
tickets, $350.00 per month for his 401K plan, and $100.00 per month for recreation which did not
include many items such as cable or dining which were accounted for under other expense categories. Id.
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come than other debtors merely because [he] wish[ed] to use some of
it to make charitable contributions.' 1 28 The court then held that if
one took all of the excess expenses that had been filtered out of the
debtor's plan by the § 1325(b) disposable income test and added them
together, the debtor would have at least $500.00 per month of disposable income and a satisfactory ability to pay the debt. 129 Therefore, his
130
Chapter 7 claim was dismissed under § 523(a)(15).
IV.

CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION CASES AFTER THE

DONATION

ACT

This Section will discuss how courts have interpreted charitable donations after the Donation Act on a provision by provision basis.
A.

A Look at Cases under § 1325(b)

In the Cavanagh131 case, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Montana held that the debtor's charitable donations were protected
by the Donation Act and denied the trustee's motion to deny confirmation of the debtor's plan under § 1325(b)(2)(A).1 32 The debtors in
Cavanagh submitted a plan to the trustee in which they claimed to
have a monthly gross income of $3,333.33 and monthly expenses of
$2,259.00.133 The trustee took exception to the debtor's plan because
it included a monthly charitable donation to the Mormon Church of
$234.00 which constituted a little more than seven percent of the
debtor's monthly gross income. 134 The court held that the plain language of the Donation Act allows a debtor to shield up to fifteen percent of his gross income from attack under § 1325(b)(2)(A) if the
debtor contributes the income to a charitable organization. 135 Because the debtor's donation only equaled about seven percent of his
gross income, the donation was unavoidable. 136 The court also held
that it was irrelevant that one of the debtors only recently joined the
Mormon Church because, in the court's view, Congress did not make
128. Id. (quoting In re Griffieth, 209 B.R. 823, 828 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996)).
129. Feldmann, 220 B.R. at 145.
130. Id. at 146-47.
131. In re Cavanagh, 242 B.R. 707 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2000).
132. Id. at 708.
133. Id. at 709.
134. Id. (noting that the $234.00 monthly donation was not included in the debtor's original
petition for bankruptcy, it first appeared on an amended petition which was filed as part of an
addendum that the debtors submitted in response to the trustee's objections to their original
petition).
135. Id. at 710-11.
136. See Cavanagh, 242 B.R. at 711.
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Likewise, in Bottelberghe,13 8 the court held that a debtor's charitable donations were not in violation of § 1325(b). 139 The creditors in
Bottelberghe took exception to the debtor's plan, under which they

would be paid only $225.00 per month for fifty-five months, because
of several of the debtor's claimed expenses, including the debtor's
$30.00 monthly donation to charities. 140 The court held that nearly all

of the expenses, including the charitable contribution, were not questionable. 14 1 However, although the charitable contribution was chal-

lenged under § 1325(b), the court did not make any mention of the
Donation Act's amendments, which specifically deal with charitable
donations. Therefore, it was unclear whether the court validated the
charitable contribution simply because it conformed with the statute,
or first applied a reasonableness test, similar to the test articulated by
the court in Buxton,142 before determining that the donation con14 3
formed with the provisions of § 1325(b).

In contrast, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Louisiana held that the Donation Act did not protect a debtor's charitable

144
donations from a trustee's § 1325(b) motion to deny confirmation.

In Buxton, the debtors were husband and wife who filed for relief

under Chapter 13.145 The debtors submitted a bankruptcy plan in
which they claimed to earn a monthly net income of $3,024.16 and to
have $2,702.00 of monthly expenses, of which $280.00 per month
would be donated to the debtors' church. 146 Under the debtors' plan
they would submit $330.00 per month 147 to the bankruptcy trustee for
137. Id. at 712.
138. In re Bottelberghe, 253 B.R. 256 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000).
139. Id. at 264.
140. Id. at 259, 264.
141. Id. at 264 (noting that the court lumped the $30.00 monthly charitable donation in with
other expenses that the creditors claimed to be excesses such as $200.00 per month for dental
care, monthly pet expenses of $16.00, a $136.00 monthly life insurance premium, $300.00 per
month for clothes, and other similar expenses).
142. See discussion infra notes 145-153 and accompanying text.
143. In re Bottelberghe, 253 B.R. at 263-64 (finding that although the court did not confirm
the debtors' plan it did so because the debtor did not supply the court with sufficient information
regarding his income to allow the court to do so).
144. See In re Buxton, 228 B.R. 606, 610 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1999).
145. Id. at 606.
146. Id. at 607.
147. Id. (noting, however the debtors' plan called for a submission of only $322.00 per month
for the first two months).
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distribution to creditors over a period of fifty-eight months. 148 The

court held that the debtor's plan did not meet the requirements of
§ 1325(b)(2)(A) because, even after the Donation Act's amendment,
the provision still demanded that all of the debtor's expenses be "reasonably necessary."'1 49 The court held that because Congress left the

reasonably necessary language in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A), it intended the courts to hold all debtors' transfers to that standard, regardless of whether or not they were donations to charitable

organizations. 150 According to the court, the debtors' donations were
not reasonably necessary for his maintenance and under the circum§ 1325(b)
trustee's
stances 151 the debtors' plan could not withstand the 15
2
confirmed.
be
not
plan
the
that
motion requesting
Similarly, in McDonald,153 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Florida held that a husband and wife's monthly charitable
154

donation was not a reasonably necessary expense under § 1325(b).

The McDonald debtors submitted a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan

which included a $320.00 monthly donation to their church. 155 The
court did not mention the Donation Act amendments of § 1325.156 Instead, the court recognized that the goal of Chapter 13 was to ensure
that creditors recovered the maximum amount possible and held that
allowing a debtor's charitable donations to his church to be classified
as a necessary expense under § 1325 would impair the achievement of
that goal. 157
148. Id. at 607 (noting that under this plan unsecured creditors would only receive $225.00 of
the $7,500.00 that the debtors owed).
149. In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 610.
150. Id. at 610.
151. Id. at 611 (finding it unreasonable, even under a discretionary spending allowance, to
grant the debtor permission to donate $280.00 per month to a church while only paying $330.00
per month into the bankruptcy repayment plan).
152. Id.
153. In re McDonald, 232 B.R. 818 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999).
154. Id. at 820.
155. Id. at 819.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 820. Interestingly, the court adopted the reasoning of In re Andrade, 213 B.R. 765,
770 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1997), rev'd, 141 F. 3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1998) in reaching its decision. Id. at
820. The court in Andrade held that charitable contributions are never reasonably necessary
expenses, but that all debtors are given a small amount of discretionary income and that a debtor
could chose to spend his discretionary funds on his favorite charity, but he could not ask for
additional discretionary funds because he donates his original allowable portion to charity. Andrade, 213 B.R. at 770-71. The McDonald court's adoption of this reasoning is interesting because the Andrade decision was overturned by the Ninth Circuit in 1998. In re Andrade, 141 F.
3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998).
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Charitable Contribution Cases under Section 707

In Smihula,158 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Rhode Island granted a trustee's section 707(b) motion to dismiss a debtor's
Chapter 7 petition for relief where the debtor planned to make a
monthly charitable donation of $700.00 per month. 159 Of particular
significance was the fact that the debtors' charitable donation was
1 60
found only on the amendment to their original bankruptcy petition.
Their original petition contained nothing in charitable contributions.1 61 The court noted that this sudden generosity would destroy
almost all of the debtors' disposable income given that the debtors
claimed $4,189.00 of monthly income and $3,251.00 worth of monthly
expenses before they filed the amended petition containing the charitable donations.' 62 Under the amended petition, the debtors' disposable income would drop from $838.00 per month to only $138.00 per
month. 163 The debtors' claimed that the amended version of § 707(b)
prohibited the court from using § 548(a)(1)(A) to characterize their
donations as actually fraudulent. 164 The court disagreed and found
the debtors' sudden decision to make large monthly donations on the
eve of filing for bankruptcy dispositive in finding the donations as actually fraudulent.1 65 Once the court recharacterized the donations as
actually fraudulent transfers under § 548(a)(1)(A), it was free to consider the donation as part of the debtor's monthly disposable income
when conducting its "ability to pay analysis" under § 707(b). 6 6 The
court then concluded that, including the $700.00 of donations, the
debtors had sufficient disposable income to demonstrate an ability to
pay their debts without depriving themselves of necessities. 167 The
court then held that because the debtors had an ability to pay their
creditors, granting their petition for relief under Chapter 7 would be a
substantial abuse of the bankruptcy system under 11 U.S.C.
168
§ 707(b).
158. In re Smihula, 234 B.R. 240 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1999).
159. Id. at 241.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 241, 243.
163. In re Smihula, 234 B.R. at 243.
164. Id. at 243.
165. Id. at 242-43 (noting that in the legislative history of the Donation Act Congress expressed the opinion that sudden generosity, even if it fits within the percentage of income parameters permitted by the Donation Act, will be considered a "badge of fraud").
166. See id. at 243.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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Similarly, in Collins,169 the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois avoided the Donation Act by dismissing a debtor's
Chapter 7 petition under § 707(a) as a bad faith filing. 170 The debtor
in Collins was a zealous philanthropist who donated $30,000.00 to
charity the year before he filed for bankruptcy and claimed that he
planned to donate at least that much during the next year. 171 The
court applied the totality of the circumstances test to the creditors'
§ 707(a) motion to dismiss the filing for cause. 172 However, before
applying this test the court was careful to note that bad faith under
§ 707(a) was different from bad faith § 707(b) in two ways. 173 First,
§ 707(a) allows creditors to challenge bankruptcy petitions, and sec174
ond, § 707(a) allows courts to consider charitable contributions.
The court then applied the totality of circumstances test and held that
the most heavily weighted circumstance was the debtor's ability to pay
his creditors. 175 The court found that the debtor clearly had an ability
to pay his creditors based on the total value of his assets, including the
76
value of those assets he had earmarked for charitable donations.
The court also looked at factors such as whether the debtor was willing to change his lifestyle, whether his filing was motivated solely by
financial gain, and whether he had made any attempt to pay his debts
in the past; the court found that the debtor failed each of these
tests. 177 The court then held that, based on these conclusions, the
debtor had filed for bankruptcy in bad faith and dismissed his claim
178
for cause under § 707(a).
C.

Charitable Contribution Cases under Sections 548 and 544

In Jackson,179 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey
held that a debtor's charitable donation could not be allowed under
§ 548(a)(1)(B). 180 The court noted that because the parties had stipulated that the donation of $20,000.00, which constituted about sev169. In re Collins, 250 B.R. 645 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000).
170. Id. at 654.
171. Id. at 653.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 654.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Collins, 250 B.R. at 654. The court noted that the debtor held over $2,300,000.00 in
life insurance funds and pension funds and found that he could pay if he were inclined and that it
was immaterial that those assets were unreachable by a court. See id.
177. Id. at 654-55.
178. See id. at 655.
179. Jackson v. Church of Manalapan, Inc. (In re Jackson), 249 B.R. 373 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000).
180. Jackson, 249 B.R. at 378.
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enty-four percent of the debtor's income, exceeded the fifteen percent
maximum allowable amount of donation to income under
§ 548(a)(2)(A), the only issue in the case was whether the donation fit
within the parameters of § 548(a)(2)(B). 181 Thus, the court had to
decide whether the donation was consistent with the debtor's prior
practices. 182 The court held that the $20,000.00 donation did not
match the debtor's prior practices even though he had donated
$14,546.00, $15,610.00, and $7,545.00 in 1995, 1996, and 1997 respectively. 183 The court then held that because the donation was not consistent with the prior practices that it was a constructively fraudulent
transfer, and therefore avoidable by the bankruptcy trustee under
184
§ 548(a)(1)(B).

In Zohdi,185 the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Louisiana also avoided a debtor's charitable donation under
§ 548(a)(2)(A). 186 The debtor donated $10,000.00 to Louisiana State
University during the twelve months preceding his filing a petition for
bankruptcy. 187 The court found that this donation exceeded fifteen
percent of the debtor's annual income by $3,450.00.188 The court then

looked to the text of 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) and noted that the plain
meaning of the text only protected individual transfers that did not
exceed fifteen percent of a debtor's income. If a transfer did in fact
exceed fifteen percent, then the entire donation was subject to attack
as a constructively fraudulent conveyance under § 548(a)(1)(B).1 89
The debtor argued that this plain meaning analysis achieved an absurd
result because it would allow one cent to be the cause for avoidance of
a transfer of thousands of dollars. 190 The court responded that it was
not a judicial function to correct a lack of foresight on the part of
Congress and that when there was a conflict between statutory wording and Congressional intent, the plain meaning of the statute would
control. 91
181. Id. at 375-77.
182. See id. at 377.
183. See id. at 374-75. The court partially based its refusal to find the 1998 donation consistent
with those of prior years not only because the amount was greater, but because the debtor did
not provide the court with proof of the debtors' income during those years that would have
enabled the court to make a percentage analysis. See id.
184. Id. at 378.
185. Zohdi v. La. State Univ. Found. (In re Zohdi), 234 B.R. 371 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1999).
186. Id. at 373.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 375.
190. Zohdi, 234 B.R. at 381-82.
191. Id. at 381.
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However, not all courts arrive at the conclusion articulated by the
Zohdi court. The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma upheld a debtor's charitable donation under §§ 548(a)(2)
and 544(b) in the Witt 192 case without considering whether the donation was in excess of fifteen percent of her annual income. 193 In Witt
the debtor donated $6,800.00 to a religious charity during the year
prior to her filing for bankruptcy and had donated at least that
amount to the same group for each of the four years prior to the year
in contest. 194 The court found that, according to the Donation Act's
amendments to §§ 544 and 548, her prior consistent donation practices
were dispositive in this case. 195 Thus, the debtor's charitable donation
196
was not avoided.
D. Charitable Contribution Cases under § 523
In McLeroy, 197 the Northern District of Texas Bankruptcy Court
disallowed the debtors' petition to discharge student loans because the
court found that if the debtors' charitable donations were included as
part of their disposable income, they would have the ability to pay
their debts without enduring any undue hardship (as is required for
student loan relief by § 523(a)(8)). 19 8 The court held that Congress
did not amend any of the provisions of § 523 when it passed the Donation Act; therefore, it did not effect the court's analysis under
§ 523(a)(8), even if the donation would be permitted by other sections
of the Bankruptcy Code under the Donation Act's amendments. 199
The court then held that the debtors were not automatically allowed
to include their donations as "appropriate expense[s] under the undue
hardship test. ' '2°° The court examined the debtors' proposed $490.00
monthly donation under normal appropriate expense standards and
held that the donation should be included as part of their disposable
income for the undue hardship analysis. 20 1 Furthermore, the court determined that the inclusion of the donation as part of the debtors'
192. Witt v. Grace Fellowship, Inc. (In re Witt), 231 B.R. 92 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1999).
193. Id. at 100.
194. See id. at 95.
195. Id. at 99-100. The applicable law that the court ruled on in the § 544 challenge was
federal law, rather than state law, hence the court could use the same analysis for both the § 548
and § 544 challenges. Id.
196. Id.
197. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. McLeroy (In re McLeroy), 250 B.R. 872 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2000).
198. Id. at 883.
199. See id. at 877-78.
200. Id. at 880.
201. See id. at 875, 882-83.
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disposable income would allow them to repay their debts without suf20 2
fering any undue hardship.
This line of reasoning was followed by the District of Idaho Bankruptcy Court in Ritchie.20 3 There, the debtors planned to donate
$315.00 (or 18.8%) of their $1671.78 monthly income to their
church. 20 4 The debtors contended that their donations should be allowed as a necessary living expense and that they had diverted income
from other areas in order to afford the monthly donations. 20 5 Before
the court made a determination about the donations, it accepted the
rest of the debtors' budget for all other expenses as satisfactory. 20 6
Then the court followed the reasoning of the McLeroy court and held
that because Congress did not amend § 523(a)(8) to shield charitable
donations from a court's consideration when determining whether a
debtor could pay his debts without suffering an undue hardship, Congress did not intend to provide the protection for those attempting to
discharge their student loan debts. 20 7 The court also found the fact
that Congress had amended § 523(a)(8) in other ways during the legislative session in which the Donation Act was passed, was particularly
probative towards showing that Congress did not intend to exclude
charitable donations from consideration as disposable income under
§ 523(a)(8). 20 8 The court then took the amount of disposable income
that the debtors claimed under their original budget and added the
amount of the donations, to arrive at a sum of $600.00 per month of
income that the debtors could use to pay their student loans. 20 9 The
court then concluded that the debtors had more than enough income
to repay their student loans. 210
However, the court in Lebovits21 ' arrived at an opposite conclusion
when analyzing a charitable contribution under Section 523(a)(8).
There, a debtor petitioned to discharge his student loans while main202. Id.
203. Ritchie v. Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. (In re Ritchie), 2000 WL 1683314 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 2000).
204. See id. at "1, *3.
205. Id. at *4.
206. Id. at *3.
207. Id. at *5-6.
208. Id. at *6 (stating that in 1998 Congress removed the provision of § 523(a)(8) that allowed
for the discharge of student loan debts that had become due seven years or more before the
debtor filed for bankruptcy).
209. Ritchie, 2000 WL 1683314 at *6.
210. Id.
211. Lebovits v. Chase Manhattan Bank (In re Lebovits), 223 B.R. 265 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1998).
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taining a $60.00 per month donation to his church. 2 12 The court's
discussion of the Donation Act was limited to its taking note that the
debtors were allowed to donate up to fifteen percent of their gross
income to charity.2 13 The court then concluded that the $60.00 donation was well within the fifteen percent maximum provided for by the
Donation Act, and therefore the charitable contribution was allowed
as a necessary expense. 2 14 The court went on to imply that it would
have allowed the debtor to donate any amount as long as it did not
215
exceed fifteen percent of the debtor's gross income.
In Wegrzyniak,2 16 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho
reached a similar result by refusing to consider nominal charitable donations under § 523(a)(8), 217 rather than implicitly adopting the fif2 18
teen percent allowance into § 523(a)(8) as the court did in Lebovits.
In Wegryzniak, the debtor sought relief from her student loan debt
while planning to donate $30.00 per month to charity. 21 9 The court
expressed some concern over whether it had discretion to consider the
charitable donations after the Donation Act.220 Nevertheless, the
court went on to hold that the donations were satisfactory under
§ 523(a)(8) not because of any protections provided by the Donation
Act, but because the amount of the donations were small enough to
22 1
be considered inconsequential in light of the other expenses.
However, in Hammond,222 the court held that a Chapter 7 debtor
could not discharge the costs associated with his divorce under
§ 523(a)(15)(A) because he had expenses, including monthly charitable donations of about $400.00 per month, which the court found to be
unnecessary for his support. 223 In determining that Congress did not
intend for the Donation Act to effect § 523(a)(15)(A), the court utilized the "negative pregnant rule of statutory construction, ' 224 which
212. Id. at 273.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. Wegrzyniak v. United States (In re Wegrzniak), 241 B.R. 689 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999).
217. See id. at 693-94.
218. See Lebovits v. Chase Manhattan Bank (In re Lebovits), 223 B.R. 265, 273 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1998).
219. Wegrzyniak, 241 B.R. at 693-94.
220. See id.
221. Id. (stating that the court felt that the donation amounts could have been spread among
the other expense amounts without pushing them above a satisfactory level under § 523(a)(8),
hence the total amount of expenses, including the charitable donations, were acceptable in the
court's eyes).
222. Hammond v. Hammond (In re Hammond), 236 B.R. 751 (Bankr. D. Utah 1998).
223. Id. at 760, 767-68.
224. Id. at 767-68.
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called for the court to contrast the express statutory statement of
§ 1325(b)(2)(A) with congressional silence on the same matter in
§ 523(a)(15)(A). 25 The court then held that the silence in § 523 indicates that Congress intended the charitable contributions protections
226
to apply only to those sections which Congress actually amended.
The court then held that the debtor's charitable donation should have
been included in his disposable income and, as a result, the debtor had
sufficient funds to provide for his maintenance and support while pay22 7
ing his debt.
V.

ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT THAT THE DONATION

ACT

HAS HAD

ON JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS IN BANKRUPTCY

This Section will examine some of the differences-or the lack
thereof-in the way in which courts have treated charitable donations
under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that have been examined in the preceding sections of this Article.
A.

Cases under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)

Prior to the enactment of the Donation Act, courts generally held
that charitable donations were unreasonable expenses unless they
were of a very small amount or the debtor received something in return for his donation.22 8 The fact that the McDonald and Buxton
courts applied these requirements to charitable donations after the enactment of the Donation Act is evidence that Congress did not suc22 9
ceed in eliminating them.
Further, many courts used disposable income tests that were identical in substance to the § 1325(b) test under other provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code before the Donation Act's passage, 230 and have
225. See id. at 767.
226. Id. at 767-68.
227. Id. at 768.
228. See In re Zaleski, 216 B.R. 425 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1997); In re Saunders, 215 B.R. 800
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1997); In re Bien, 95 B.R. 281 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989).
229. See In re McDonald, 232 B.R. 818 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999); In re Buxton, 228 B.R. 606
(Bankr. W.D. La. 1999).
230. See Feldmann v. Feldmann (In re Feldmann), 220 B.R. 138 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1998) (applying the § 1325(b) disposable income test to a § 523(a)(15) ability to pay analysis); In re
Smither, 194 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996) (holding that the § 1325(b) disposable income test
case law had been adopted by courts applying § 523(15)); Lynn v. Diversified Collection Serv.
(In re Lynn), 168 B.R. 693 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (holding that the § 1325(b) definition of disposable income was applicable in making a § 523(a)(8) determination)).
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continued to do so after the enactment of the Donation Act. 231 This
is curious because it is apparent that not all courts feel compelled to
adjust their interpretation of what constitutes disposable income
under these other provisions despite the fact that Congress has explicitly changed them. The McLeroy case is particularly interesting because it holds that the Lynn case is the guiding precedent for
charitable contributions under § 523(a)(8). 232 However, while Lynn
explicitly adopts the disposable income test of § 1325(b), 233 the
McLeroy court disregards the changes that Congress made to
§ 1325(b) with the Donation Act. 23 4 If § 1325(b) is really the standard, should not the courts incorporate Congress' changes into their
analysis, or are the courts free to apply the 1995 version of § 1325(b)
as opposed to the current version?
The Donation Act appears to have stripped courts of some discretion over whether to include a charitable contribution that is less than
fifteen percent of the debtor's gross income as part of the debtor's
disposable income under § 1325.235 However, some courts are still applying the § 1325(b) reasonableness test to charitable contributions
and have maintained discretion over whether to include charitable donations as disposable income when analyzing them under other provi236
sions of the Bankruptcy Code.
B.

Donation Act's Influence under § 707

The Donation Act's amendment to § 707 was an attempt to protect
certain charitable contributions from sua sponte attacks by the court
and from attacks initiated by a bankruptcy trustee claiming substantial
abuse. 237 However, as demonstrated by the Smihula court, Congress
did not succeed in preventing courts from using § 548(a)(1)(A) to
recharacterize the charitable donations as actually fraudulent transfers. 238 Once a court recharacterizes a donation as fraudulent, it is no
239
longer protected by the Donation Act's amendments to § 707(b).
Thus, the court may evaluate the charitable donation according to
231. See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. McLeroy (In re McLeroy), 250 B.R. 872 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2000); In re Smihula, 234 B.R. 240 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1999) (applying the § 1325(b) disposable
income test to a § 707(b) substantial abuse analysis).
232. McLeroy, 250 B.R. at 877.
233. See supra Section II.A.4.
234. See McLeroy, 250 B.R. at 877.
235. See supra sections III.A.1, IV.A.
236. See supra sections III.A.2-4, IV.A.2-4.
237. See supra section II.B.
238. See supra section IV.B.
239. See id.
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standards that are no different than those used by the courts before
240
the Donation Act.
In addition, the Donation Act did not amend § 707(a), which allows
creditors to challenge bankruptcy petitions. 241 As shown by the Collins court, charitable donations may be used to show that a debtor
filed for bankruptcy in bad faith when a court considers a creditor's
motion to dismiss for cause under § 707(a). 2 42 Thus, a proactive creditor may still defeat a debtor's bankruptcy petition if she believes that
she can show the debtor filed in bad faith-even if she must use the
debtor's charitable donations as evidence of this bad faith.24 3
C.

Donation Act's Influence on Cases under § 548

The amendment to § 548 was an attempt to shield charitable donations from being characterized as constructively fraudulent, while preserving the courts' ability to avoid those transfers that could fairly be
characterized as actually fraudulent. 244 The Witt case demonstrates
that this amendment has been partially successful because there the
court refused to avoid a transfer, in light of the Donation Act, which
was similar to a transfer that the Newman court avoided as construc245
tively fraudulent just four years earlier.
However, the Donation Act cannot claim a total success in amending § 548 because of the confusion that Zohdi court demonstrated.
The question of whether a donation that exceeds fifteen percent of
debtor's gross income is avoidable in its entirety or only to the extent
that it exceeds the fifteen percent maximum still remains unanswered. 246 Also, as demonstrated by the Jackson court, there is no
definition in the Donation Act's amendments which clearly state what
constitutes a prior consistent practice. 247 In Jackson, the court
avoided a transfer which was clearly inconsistent in both amount and
percentage of debtor's income. 248 However, in making its determination the court relied only on a dictionary definition of consistency,
240.
31, 38
241.
242.

Compare In re Smihula, 234 B.R. 240, 243 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1999), with In re Lee, 162 B.R.
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).
See supra sections II.B., IV.B.
See In re Collins, 250 B.R. 645, 654 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000).

243. See id.
244. See 144 CONG. REC. H3999-02, H4000 (June 3, 1998) (statement of Rep. Gekas).

245. Compare Witt v. Grace Fellowship, Inc. (In re Witt), 231 B.R. 92, 99-100 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 1999), with Newman v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239, 242-43
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1995).
246. See supra section IV.C.
247. In re Jackson, 249 B.R. 373, 377 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000).
248. Jackson, 249 B.R. at 377.
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which provides no bright line guidance for courts to use in close
cases. 249
D. Donation Acts' Influence on § 523 Cases

While Congress did amend § 523 in 1998, it did not do so with the
Donation Act. Therefore, Congress did not provide any explicit protection for charitable contributions under this section. 250 However,
that did not prevent debtors from attempting to import the Donation
Act's protection into § 523 cases. 25 1 Courts have generally refused to

recognize that § 523 analysis was changed in any way by the Donation
Act,252 and as a result there has been little change in case results after
253
the Donation Act.
This has created confusion. For instance, the Lebovits case demon-

strates that a court may take the fact that Congress made an attempt
to protect charitable donations in other parts of the Bankruptcy Code
as congressional indication that courts should allow a broader portion
of charitable donations. 254 On the other hand, some courts have

viewed the lack of change in § 523 as an indication that Congress' intent was that analysis under § 523 should not be changed by the Donation Act.255
VI.

CONCLUSION

Charities pressured Congress in response to a perceived vulnerability that they felt was promulgated by the Supreme Court's decision in
2 57
Boerne.25 6 Congress responded by passing the Donation Act,
which at first seemed to be cause for concern for creditors and counsel
that protect creditors' rights. However, the Donation Act has not pre249. See id.
250. See supra section IV.D.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id. It should be noted that the debtor in Lebovits was making charitable contributions in amounts similar to those of the debtor in Wegrzyniak, which the Wegrzyniak court held
to be de minimus. Wegrzyniak, 241 B.R. at 694. Also, the Lebovits court did not give any reason
for why the Donation Act should apply in § 523 cases aside from the possibility that Congress
was implying leniency for charitable donations. See id. Also the Lebovits court did not give any
reason for why the Donation Act should apply in § 523 cases aside from the possibility that
Congress was implying leniency for charitable donations. See In re Ritchie, 2000 WL 1683314, at
*5 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000).
255. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. McLeroy (In re McLeroy), 250 B.R. 872, 882 n.14 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 2000).
256. See supra section I.
257. See id.
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vented courts from applying old standards of reasonableness to a
debtor's gifts. 258 Nor has it prevented courts from using other parts of

the Bankruptcy Code to recharacterize the debtor's donations into
2 59
something that will remove it from the Donation Act's safe harbor.
The Donation Act also contains ambiguity in areas such as what constitutes a prior consistent practice and what should happen to a donation that exceeds fifteen percent of the debtor's gross income. 260
Given these inconsistencies, there has been little net gain for charities in terms of the types of transfers that will be allowed after the
Donation Act, and little corresponding increase in threat to the rights
of commercial creditors. Courts are using roughly the same standards,
and charities are left with nearly the same concerns in far too many
cases for the Donation Act to be considered a blow to organizations
that provide credit to consumers as well as to many small businesses.
Deft navigation through the maze of loopholes and gaps in statutory
construction that Congress left in its collection of amendments can
place creditors on ground essentially level with the ground that they
stood on before the Donation Act came to be.

258. See supra section IV.A.
259. See supra section V.A,B.
260. See section V.C.

